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This paper traces the historical development of the international tax system, 
and shows why it is increasingly unﬁ t for purpose, especially in view of the 
growing dominance of transnational corporations (TNCs). It makes proposals 
for an evolutionary shift towards a unitary approach for taxing TNCs.
Purpose and origins of the 
international tax system
International coordination of taxation – 
especially as it applies to transnational 
corporations – is essential to sustain the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of national tax 
systems, as well as efﬁ cient international 
allocation of capital investment. The 
international system should allow ﬁ rms and 
individuals to avoid double taxation, while 
ensuring that the tax paid by a ﬁ rm in each 
country is a fair reﬂ ection of its activities in 
that country. The paper discusses two broad 
ways to do this: i) treat afﬁ liates as separate 
entities for tax, but adjust their accounts as 
necessary to ensure fair apportionment of 
proﬁ t by attributing to the afﬁ liate the income 
it could be expected to derive were it an 
independent enterprise (the “Arm’s Length 
Principle”); or ii) start from the accounts of 
the ﬁ rm as a whole, and assess tax for 
afﬁ liates as a proportion of the unitary ﬁ rm’s 
total proﬁ ts on the basis of an appropriate 
allocation formula (a “unitary” or “fractional 
apportionment” approach).
The foundations for the present international 
tax system were established in model tax 
treaties agreed through the League of 
Nations, starting in 1928; these became the 
basis for bilateral treaties and for subsequent 
OECD model treaties. They adopted the 
Arm’s Length Principle, adapting rules 
originally aimed at portfolio investment, and 
allowed host countries to tax afﬁ liates which 
were separate legal entities, while making 
adjustments as necessary through 
negotiation with national tax authorities to 
ensure that the prices charged for intra-ﬁ rm 
transactions did not entail diversion of proﬁ ts. 
The alternative, unitary approach was 
considered politically too difﬁ cult as it would 
have required an international agreement on 
tax accounting principles and common 
allocation formulas. However the system that 
was adopted required close cooperation 
between national tax authorities through a 
network of bilateral treaties, and allowed, or 
even encouraged, transnational corporations 
to avoid taxation, principally by i) transfer 
pricing to shift proﬁ ts, and ii) channelling 
payments through intermediary entities 
established in tax havens.
Attempts by OECD countries to counter tax 
avoidance have added to the incoherence of 
the system. For example rules relating to 
“controlled foreign corporations” strengthened 
the rights of home countries to tax TNCs; 
while new and increasingly elaborate transfer 
pricing guidelines developed by the OECD 
ran counter to this, strengthening the “separate 
entity” approach and further embedding the 
Arm’s Length Principle.
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A unitary 
approach 
would help 
resolve many 
of the problems 
associated with 
the current 
system including 
administration of 
transfer pricing 
regulations, 
and harmful tax 
competition.
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Why the system is un t for 
purpose, especially for 
developing countries
The current system has become unworkable 
as TNCs have become more dominant and 
globally integrated. Rules originally designed 
to apply to businesses with a physical 
presence in the host country do not 
adequately cover digital economy companies 
with a virtual presence, or those providing 
services. OECD guidelines on transfer 
pricing, which are central to adjusting proﬁ ts 
under the Arm’s Length Principle, have 
become impossible to apply effectively or 
consistently: attempting to identify the 
appropriate prices for transactions with an 
afﬁ liate by comparison with those applied by 
independent ﬁ rms for `comparables’ is 
inappropriate for TNCs which derive their 
competitive advantage from intangibles and 
synergies between different business 
activities and locations.
 The whole process of negotiating tax 
assessments between afﬁ liates and national 
tax authorities has become expensive, 
time-consuming, arbitrary and opaque, 
leaving scope for corruption. Developing 
countries in particular lack resources to apply 
complex checks on transfer pricing. Attempts 
to build capacity of developing country tax 
specialists to operate a dysfunctional system 
represent poor use of resources. The 
institutional framework for international tax 
coordination which is dominated by the OECD 
has itself become increasingly inappropriate. 
In practice, BRICS and other developing 
countries are adopting approaches that 
diverge from OECD practices, while paying 
lip-service to the Guidelines.
The current dysfunctional system has wider 
negative impact. It results in loss of 
much-needed revenue, especially for 
developing countries, and undermines the 
legitimacy of taxation more generally. It 
gives TNCs signiﬁ cant competitive 
advantage over national ﬁ rms, and leads to 
inefﬁ cient allocation of investment. The 
offshore secrecy system – facilitated by 
loopholes in the current system – supports 
systematic tax evasion and money 
laundering, as well as tax avoidance.
Opportunities for reform 
and policy implications
There is inbuilt resistance to change, from 
tax administrators comfortable with the 
existing system, tax advisers who beneﬁ t 
from it, and TNCs which exploit opportunities 
for tax avoidance. But a new context has 
been created by the ﬁ scal crisis following the 
crash of 2007-8, as OECD countries seek 
extra revenue to repair ﬁ scal deﬁ cits, and 
with growing media and public concern 
about tax fairness, tax avoidance, evasion 
and money laundering.
The paper advocates a fundamental but 
evolutionary shift towards a unitary tax 
system which would treat TNCs as single 
ﬁ rms, not as a loose collection of separate 
entities. A unitary approach would help 
resolve many of the problems associated 
with the current system including 
administration of transfer pricing regulations, 
and harmful tax competition. Elements of a 
new system would include:
i) Agreement on a template for TNCs to 
submit a combined and country by country 
report to each tax authority, including 
worldwide accounts for the ﬁ rm as a whole; 
details of all entities, and relationships and 
transactions between them; and data on 
physical assets, employees, sales and 
actual taxes paid. This could be done 
without changes to international rules.
ii) A proﬁ t apportionment system, based on 
the combined reporting, which would 
allocate proﬁ ts according to an agreed 
formula, taking account of physical 
assets, employees and sales (by location 
of the customer). This could initially build 
on elements of existing practice including 
provisions under transfer pricing 
guidelines for apportionment of combined 
proﬁ ts, and advance pricing agreements 
with TNCs.
iii) A procedure for resolving disputes between 
states, building on elements that already 
exist in mutual agreement procedures 
and advance pricing agreements.
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